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FOREWORD 
Monetary inflation is an extremely complicated subject. 
It is impossible to cover it adequately in one brief publica-
tion. The purpose of this circular is simply to trace what 
consequences may be expected to follow from certain 
actions. The purpose is rather to draw attention to fea-
tures that require further study, than to attempt to give 
a comprehensive answer to the inflation question. 
This is the seventh publication in a series dealing with 
the present agricultural emergency. The first circular in 
the series "The Situation Today" presented the main facts 
of the case. The second circular, "The Causes of the Emer-
gency,'' dealt with the causative factors. The third circular 
was entitled, "The Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan;" 
·the fourth circular, "The Iowa Farm 1\fortgage Situation." 
The fifth circular, dealing with monetary questions, was 
entitled, "The Control of the General Price Level." The 
sixth circular was entitled, "The !Olva Tax Situation-An 
Analysis for Farmers.'' The present circular deals with 
monetary inflation. Other circulars are to follow in this 
emergency series. 
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The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa 
VII. Monetary Inflation 
BY GEOFFREY SHEPHERD and WALLACE Wa10HT• 
Proposals for the relief of agriculture and other industries in 
the present emergency can be divided into several main groups. 
Two of these groups are (1) those measures which would inflate 
the general price level toward the height at which debts were 
contracted a few years ago, and (2) measures to deflate debts in 
line with present deflated prices. 
This bulletin deals with the proposals in the first group, that 
is, the measures for price inflation. 
Where Prices Stand Now 
The first objective of the proposals for price inflation is a rise 
in the general price Jevel ; most of the proposals aim to bring 
about this rise in prices by monetary means. 
The different proposals for price inflation need to· be consid-
ered in the light of the present price situation. Price inflation . 
has to be effected through a complicated price mechanism, the 
control of which is not generally understood. Furthermore, this 
price mechanism is not a local nor a domestic affair ; it covers the 
globe, and the United States is only one element in it. A study 
of the price situation, therefore, cannot stop at the borders of 
the United States, but needs to include the situation in other 
countries as well. 
The height of the general price level in the United States today, 
in relation to past years, is shown in fig. 1. The line shows the 
movements that ha\•e taken place in the general average level of 
commodity prices at wholesale during the past 130 years. In the 
preparation of this chart, the period of years from 1910 to 1914 
was taken ·as the base period, and the changes in the price level 
are expressed as a pei:eentage of that base.1 
The price line in the chart shows three bold peaks. They re-
sulted from inflation during the War of 1812, the Civil War and 
the World War. 
The chart shows further that the general price level has now 
returned approximately to pre-war levels. In fact, during the 
latte~ half of 1932 the price level fell 5 to 7 points below pre-war. 
•The authon creatlr appreciate the helplal crltlcl1m1 aad 1ane1tfoaa made ltr 
Dr. A. O. Black, chief, and profe11or1 Paul L. Miller and T. W. Schult& of the 
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Some observers have noted this return to approximately pre-
'var levels with approval. They regard it as an evidence that the 
world has finally got the war and post-war inflation out of its 
system and returned to the sound monetary conditions that ex-
isted just before the war. 
This opinion bas nry little basis in fact. It is now 19 years 
since the World War began, and the world monetary situation 
has passed through some revolutionary changes since then. . The 
United States and France together now hold 60 percent of the 
world's monetary stocks of gold.2 Most of the other countries 
of the world went off the gold standard during 1931; if they 
return to gold, they will probably revalue their currencies at 
lower gold values than before the war. France revalued her 
currency at one-fifth of its pre-war gold value, in 1928, before 
the depression began. In fact, the United States is the only 
important country whose currency has the same gold value now 
as before the war. 
Furthermore, the establishment of the Federal Reserve sys-
tem in the United States has altered the monetary efficiency of 
gold; and in both England and the United States, gold has almost 
completely disappeared from band-to-hand circulation, being 
now held in the vaults of the central banks. 
Along with these monetary changes have gone great disloca-
tions in world relationships and reversals in financial and trade 
policies. These upheavals have altered debtor-creditor relation-
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ships and resulted in a heavy "-one-way traffic" of payments to 
the United States and France. ·This has resulted in a great mal-
distribution of gold in the world, so that the world's stocks of 
gold at the present time are not able to exert their full effect on 
prices. 
What the net result of these conflicting changes will be, nobody 
can tell. They may give us higher price levels, or lower price 
levels, than those which existed before the war. It is only by 
chance that they \Vill give us levels the same as pre-war. We can 
regard present price leve~ as only a temporary resting place, not 
as bed-rock. Figure 2 shows that after the Civil War, prices 
declined to roughly pre-war levels for a few years, and then de-
clined 27 percent during the ensuing 15 years. Nobody knows 
\Vhether history is likely to repeat itself now, or to reverse itself. 
Accordingly, we cannot assume that our price levels will remain 
stable at their present height in the future, any more than they 
have in the past. There is no certainty that if things are left 
to themselves, the price level will stabilize of its own accord. 
Several different plans for accomplishing stability of price 
levels have been advocated. Since we are now suffering from a 
fall in prices, the first objective of these plans is to inflate or 
reflate present price levels toward the levels existing a few· years 
ago. The various proposals may be grouped under three different 
heads: (1) those which would work through credit inflation, (2) 
those which would work through currency inflation, and (3) those 
whose aim is to increase both currency and credit by reducing the 
gold value of the dollar. 
Credit inflation has been discussed in a previous· circular in 
this series, No. 143, "Control of the General Price Level." Cur-
rency inflation, and reducing the gold content of the dollar. 
are discussed in the present publication •. 
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CURRENCY EXPANSION 
Proposals for currency expansion constitute perhaps the sim-
plest attack on the problem of raising the general price level. 
The reasoning behind these proposals is that (1) the general 
commodity price level has fallen-that is, the value of money has 
risen; (2) increasing the quantity of money will lower its value; 
(3) therefore the amount of currency should be increased. 
It is interesting to note that one or two steps have already been 
taken in this direction. Before 1932, J!'ederal Reserve banks were 
required to back their notes 40 percent (or more) in gold and 
60 percent in commercial paper; since the Glass-Steagall bill was 
enacted a year ago, however, banks have been permitted to issue 
notes against 40 percent gold and 60 percent United States gov-
ernment securities, whenever the supplies of commercial paper 
are inadequate.3 
The conditions under which bank notes (currency) can be 
issued have been eased somewhat further by the passage of the 
Home· Loan Bank Act in July, 1932. This act broadened the 
definition of the kind of United States securities against which 
national bank notes may be issued, to include all United States 
bonds bearing interest at a rate not to exceed 3% percent.• This 
permitted the national banks to issue nearly 1 billion dollars 
more notes than was possible before, if they wished to do so. 
This amount is more than the entire issue of national bank notes 
outstanding when the act was passed. National banks, however, 
have used their new privilege only to the extimt of 166 million 
dollars.G 
Currency Is Only a Small Part of Our Total Money 
Programs of currency expansion have serious limitations. To 
begin with, currency is only a small element in our total circulat-
ing medium. Ordinarily, only 10 percent of our total circulat-
ing medium is currency or cash money ; the other 90 percent is 
credit money. There usually is about 10 times as much deposit 
or credit money in existence as there is currency. The situation 
during the last few years is shown in fig. 2. 
Some advocates of currency expansion, observing the 10 to 1 
ratio that ordinarily exists between currency and credit money, 
believe that currency is the base or foundation, and that credit 
money is a sort of 10-story superstructure built upon it. They 
believe further that if the base were broadened the superstructure 
would widen proportionally; the issue of 1 billion dollars of 
currency would then result in an expansion of 10 billion dollars 
of credit money. 
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But this belief is not correct. The foundation of the credit 
superstructure is not currency, but gold. The amount of credit 
money outstanding is not determined by the amount of currency 
in circulation .. It is determined by two other things, (1) by the 
stocks of gold in the country, and (2) by the state of business 
confidence, which determines how closely the limits set by the 
gold supply will be approached .. 
The stocks of gold in the country set the outer limits beyond 
which credit expansion cannot go, because the law specifies that 
our bank reserves (i.e., monetary foundation) shall be gold; and 
the law furthe~ speeifies definite legal minimum reserves of gold 
that cannot be exceeded except under penalty. Ordinary country 
and city banks must maintain a 10 percent reserve of gold (the 
percentage ranges from 7 to 13 according to the size of the city 
in which the bank is located) behind their deposit or credit money 
outstanding. They cannot c.°\':pand their credit money, i.e., their 
deposits, to an amount more than 10 time.Ii a.Ii great as their gold 
holdings, except by borrowing from Federal Reserve banks. And 
the Federal Reserve banks must maintain a 35 percent reser\-e 
of gold against their deposit liabiliticl-i, which consist mainly of 
the reserve accounts of the ordinary city or country banks that 
belong to the system.6 
The stocks of gold in the country, therefore, are the foundation 
on which the superstructure of credit m~ney is built. Because 
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of the legal minimum reserve requirements mentioned above, the 
gold foundation ordinarily will not support a credit money struc-
ture more than 12 stories high-that is, more than 12 times the 
size of the gold foundation. 
It is the second factor, the state of business confidence, ho'v._ 
ever, that determines whether we will build our superstructure of 
credit up to that limit, or whether we will stop short of it. When 
confidence reigns, people ask freely for credit, feeling confident 
that they can repay it; and bankers lend it freely, for the same 
reason. It makes very little difference whether people take the 
credit money they borrow in the form of currency, or whether 
they pref er to leave it on deposit and write checks on it. 
At the present time, our gold foundation is ample ; but busi-
ness confidence is shaken, and our credit superstructure has 
shrunk from 12 stories until now it is only 9 stories high-only 
9 times the size of our gold foundation.7 
Small Effect on Total Money 
The factor determining the amount of credit money outstancl-
ing, then, is not the amount of currency or paper money in cir-
culation, but the stock of gold in the country, which sets upper 
limits beyond which credit expansion cannot go; and the state 
of business confidence determines how closely the limits set by 
this stock of gold will be approached. Expanding the currency 
'vould not increase either of these two controlling factors. It 
might simply displace an equivalent amount of other money. The 
most that can be e."<pected of an increase in the currency is that 
it will result in an increase in total money of the same amount. 
That is, if we were to increase the currency 1 billion dollars, 
the most we could expect would be that it 'vould increase our 
total money 1 billion dollars. 
Figure 2 shows that in the United States at the present time 
there is 41.8 billion dollars of credit money out~tanding,8 and 5.7 
billion dollars of currency. The total money, then, is 47.5 billion 
dollars. 
. Some proposals for currency exi>ansion have recommended the 
issue of 2 or 3 billion dollars of additional currency. These 
represent rather large amounts of currency, but they constitute 
rather small additions to our total money outstanding. Three 
billion dollars is only 6 percent of our total money of 47.5 billion 
dollars. The direct effect on prices of only a 6 percent increase 
in the total money would not be large; in fact it might be offset 
by other contrary effects. It is evident in fig. 2 that during the 
past three years our currency in circulation has increased from 
4.5 to 5.7 billion, but our credit money has decreased from 55 
billion to 41.8 billion. This is a net contraction of 12.2 billion. 
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The 1 billion dollar increase in currency since 1929 has not 
kept prices from falling, because it has been much more than 
offset by the· 13 billion dollar contraction of credit money. To 
restore 1925-1929 average prices we would have to expand our 
currency at least as much as our credit moriey has contracted, say 
12 or 13 billion dollars. 
This is a pretty big order. It would mean expanding our pres-
ent currency to three times its present volume. There is not free 
gold enough in the country for that. Most of our currency re-
quires a backing of 40 percent gold; 40 percent of 13 billion is 
about 5 billion, and there is not that much gold in the United 
States; our total stocks of gold stand now at about 4.4 billion 
dollars, and most of it is already tied up as backing for currency 
and credit. 
This gold-supply limitation is not insurmountable. It could 
be handled by reducing our minimum gold reserve requirements 
from their present 4() percent to say 20 percent, or by abolishing 
gold reserve requirements entirely. These possibilities are con-
sidered in later sections of this bulletin. 
A Surplus of Currency 
A second difficulty confronting programs for currency infla-
tion is that we are not a currency using nation; we are primarily 
a check-and-deposit using people. We make 9/10 of our pay-
ments by check. We do not like to carry large amounts of cur-
rency around; it is bulky and inconvenient and is likely to be 
lost or stolen. We prefer to deposit most of our currency in the 
bank and write checks against it. 
Accordingly, if a substantial amount of additional paper 
money were issued, it would not stay out in circulation. Most of 
it would be deposited in banks, and the banks would send it in to 
the central banks to be counted as reserves. It would simply 
build up the reserves of banks. 
This would not do us any good. Our banks at the present time 
already have more reserves than they feel they can profitably 
loan out. The open-market operations of the Federal Reserve 
banks in 1932 resulted in a great surplus of bank reserves, but 
these large reserves have not caused prices to rise. Building up 
these bank reserves still further by expanding the currency 
would not be any more effective. 
There is one respect in which an expansion of the currency 
could help prices. If the currency were issued in such a way 
that it placed additional income and purchasing power in the 
bands of people who at present lack purchasing power, the spend-
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ing of this additional. purchasing power would increase the 
demand for goods and would raise prices. A great deal depends 
upon how the currency is issued and who gets it. 'Ve will con-
sider that question next. 
Putting the Currency in Circulation 
If the federal government simply paid out the new currency 
in the ordinary course of its operations, the effect on prices would 
be ·nil. Government employees, war veterans and other recip-
ients would simply deposit the currency in the bank, and draw 
checks on their accounts as before. .Any currency that was not 
thus exchanged for bank deposits would merely render an equal 
amount of already existing currency excessive and ca~se it to be 
retired. No new purchasing power would have been brought into 
the market, and there would be no reason for prices to rise. 
. The only way to make the issue of additional money affect 
prices is to place it in the hands of people who will go out and 
buy things with it, things which otherwise they would not have 
bought. The new buying must be additi011al buying. It is this 
increase in purchasing, this increase in demand, that raises 
prices. There is no use in issuing more money unless this will 
result in additional purchasing power in the market. Prices 
rose during the World War, not simply because the government 
issued more money, but because it went out and spent it. 
This means that new' government money issued now would 
raise prices only if" it represented additional spending on the 
part of the government-spending for unemployment relief, for 
example, through a program of public construction work, or 
directly as subsistence payments to unemployed families. . 
Now there are only three sources from which the federal gov-
ernment can get funds for additional spending. One is increased 
taxation ; the second is the sale of bonds, i. e., borrowing; and 
the third is the issue of paper money. 
Increased taxation would meet with great popular objection 
at the present time, and in any case 'vould probably fall short of 
supplying all the funds required. The second or third method 
would have to be used; the government would ha\•e to issue more 
bonds in order to make its budget balance, or else resort to paper 
money. 
The prospect of issuing more bonds inspires alarm in some 
quarters. It is pointed out that already the federal deficit for 
the first seven months of the 1932-33 fiscal year is $1,272 million,o 
and that this has had to be met by issuing an equal amount of 
bonds; and if the government increased its expenditures still 
further, the budget would be still further unbalanced. 
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Should the Budget Be Balanced? 
Opinions differ; however, as to whether an unbalanced budget 
in time of depression is necessarily an evil. Some economists 
believe that during depressions the government should not bal-
ance the budget, at least not by reducing expenditures. They 
point out that during a. boom, industrial expenditures a.re greatly 
increased, and during a slump, they are greatly curtailed. If 
government expenditures were decreased during a boom and in-
creased during a slump, this would offset some of the 6.uctuations 
in business expenditures, partly stabilize employment and reduce 
the severity of the swings from prosperity to depression and back 
again. 
During the present depression, then, some argue that it would 
be good policy for the government to anticipate its construction 
expenditures for the next 10 years and embark upon them heavily 
now rather than 5 or 10 years from now. The government is 
already loaning or spending large sums for unemployment relief. 
If these sums were spent instead on self-liquidating projects and 
other construction work, the government would have a definite 
addition to its physical plant to show for its money, and would 
be able to spend less money on construction work in the future. 
We would then have, not a currency inflation, but a mild form 
of government credit inflation. 
Probably the greatest limitation of this policy is that it requires 
financing by the sale of federal government bonds, and there is 
a limit to the amount of these bonds that the market can absorb. 
During 1932, the amount of United States government securities 
outstanding increased 3 billion dollars, from 17.5 billion to 20.5 
billion.10 During 1933 the amounts are expected to increase still 
further. 
Opinions differ as to how many additional billions could be 
issued without burdening the market for all bonds, or perhaps 
arousing fears as to the ultimate solvency of the government. All 
that we can say is that somewhere a limit to additional security 
issues does exist, that a program dependent upon additional 
flotations of United States securities has limits, and that these 
lim~ts probably lie this side of pronounced price inflation. 
Inconvertible Paper Money 
We have dealt with two sources of federal funds, increased 
taxation and increased borrowing by issuing bonds. Both of 
these have limitations. The third source would be free of these 
limitations, and it would not unbalance the budget. The federal 
government could issue currency that would not be convertible 
into gold. This currency would be inconvertible paper money, 
like the greenbacks that were issued during the Chi! War. 
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Inconvertible paper money, however, is subject to two or three 
serious disadvantages. If only a small amount were issued, it 
would simply displace an equivalent amount of our present cur-
rency. If a large amount were issued, it would not stay out in 
circulation any better than a large amount of convertible paper 
would. And finally, it would involve our going off the gold 
standard. 
Now there is nothing sacred about the gold standard. A large 
part of the 'vorld is now off gold, and in view of the 
present world situation, is much better off than if it had tried to 
stay on. England went off gold in September, 1931, and its 
general price level has remained practically stable ever since; but 
price levels in the United States have fallen 10 percent and in 
France have fallen 13 percent.11 
The gold standard can be judged, like anything else, simply on 
its merits. It may be that the merits or advantages of the gold 
standard are greater than its disadvantages; it may be that 
they are less. Let us see what these advantages and disadvan-
tages are. 
What the Gold Standard Does 
When the gold standard is permitted to work freely, it has 
three merits. It serves as a check on extreme inflation, it facili-
tates international trade by keeping exchanges stable, and it 
keeps the value of the different nations' currencies in line with 
each other. 
'Ve have spoken of the superstructure of credit that is erected 
upon the foundation of gold. In the United States, the legal 
minimum gold reserve restrictions make it difficult to build this 
superstructure more than 12 or 13 stories high. Beyond that 
point, inflation is checked by the limitations of the gold supply. 
Furthermore, if prices in one country rise more than those in 
other countries, that country becomes a good market for the sale 
of other countries' goods. Additional goods therefore flow in, 
and gold flows out to pay for them. This outflow of gold pulls 
prices down in line with their former relationship to prices in 
other countries, and equilibrium is restored. 
Finally, international tr,ade is facilitated when nations are on 
the gold standard, because goods can then be paid for in terms 
of currencies which remain fixed in relationship to each other. 
Gold Standard Difficulties 
. 
These are the benefits tlmt are usually associated with the gold 
standard. Since the war, however, the gold standard has ap-
peared to be attended with great disadvantages. For example, 
England's return to her pre-war gold standard in 1925 appeared 
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to be one of the factors that dragged her into financial and indus-
trial troubles; her situation finally became so acute in 1931 that 
in order to get partial relief, she had to go off gold. 
What appear to be shortcomings of the gold standard today, 
however, are almost entirely the result of arbitrary restrictions 
and regulations that have kept the gold standard from working; 
these restrictions in turn are a result of conflicting international 
trade and financial policies after the war. The trouble with 
the gold standard since the war is that it has been almost smoth-
ered by tariffs, exchange restrictions and other measures designed 
to keep it from working out its normal effects. Each country has 
attempted to regulate the operation of the gold standard to its 
own advantage. As a result, more than half the world has been 
drained dry of gold and is now off the gold standard ; and the 
rest of the world has such a surplus of gold that its gold has lost 
many of its functions. · 
England benefited by going off the gold standard; her action 
relieved the pressure which foreign drains of gold were exerting 
upon her slender gold resource.'!. But the United States is bur-
dened with an excess of gold. It "·ould not be any advantage to 
us to go off the gold standard in order to is.'!ue greenbacks; that 
woulcl not relieve us of any adYerse effects of gold, and it would 
rob us of what ad\•antages there are in being on the gold standard 
today. 
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MEASURES TO REDUCE THE GOLD CONTENT 
OF THE DOLLAR 
Currency expansion is only one of the many different methods 
of price inflation. .Another method for attaining price inflation 
is the proposal to reduce the gold content of the dollar from its 
present figure, 23.22 grains of gold, to, say, 16 grains. 
Some people reason that since the general price level has fallen 
cine-third since 1929, the value of the dollar in turn has risen 
one-third ;12 and that reducing the gold content of the dollar 
one-third would lower its value and restore the general pricie 
level to its former height. 
There is a rather serious question about the second step of this 
reasoning. The gold content or gold price of the dollar has not 
changed for generations; it bas remained fixed at 23.22 grains 
since 1837. It is the goods purchasing power of the dollar that 
has increased since 1929. Lowering the gold content of the dol-
lar is only one step in the direction of lowering the goods pur-
chasing power of the dollar; it would not lower the purchasing 
power directly, but only indirectly; and this indirect effect would 
follow only under certain conditions. 
Let us try to trace the chain of cause and effect by which low-
ering the gold content of the dollar might lower its purchasing 
power, that is, raise the general price level. . 
Action Needed to Prevent Heavy Movements of Gold 
The first effect of reducing the irold content of the dollar woulcl 
be this: .As soon as it became evident that the government was 
going to reduce the gold content of the dollar, the natural thing 
for people to do would be to take currency-five-dollar bills, etc., 
-to the bank and ask for gold in exchange. They would get 
23.22 grains of gold for each dollar of currency presented . 
.After the gold content of the dollar was reduced to 16 grains, 
people who had previously presented currency and demanded 
gold in exchange for it would then rel'crse the process; they 
would present the gold they had obtained and demand currency 
for it. For each 23.22 grains of f?Old they presented, they could 
then demand $1.45.13 The operation of exchanging currency for 
gold before the gold content of the dollar was reduced, and then 
reversing the proces.<1 aftenmrds, would net them 45 percent on 
their money. People in foreign countries could do the same as 
our citizens. 
Accordingly, the first effect of reducing the gold value of the 
dollar would be a general scramble for f?old. A Rreat internal 
and external drain of gold would take place. The temporary 
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withdrawals of golcl would be heavier than our stock of gold 
could meet. For the time being, the United States would have 
to refuse to pay out gold-that is, it would have to go oft' the 
gold standard. She would have to take this action early, because 
people would start to draw out gold as soon as reducing the gold 
ccntent of the dollar began to be seriously considered in Congress 
-long before the reduction could actually go into effect. Busi-
ness confidence would be somewhat disturbed by the United 
States going off gold, but how much disturbed, .no one can say. 
In any case, the United States could return to the gold standard 
without delay as soon as the reduction of the gold content of the 
dollar was effected. 
Suppose, then, that the United State.'i Treasury announced its 
intention to reduce the gold content of the dollar from 23.22 to 
16 grains. Suppose also that it went off the gold standard until 
this reduction had been effected, and then returned to gold. 
Would this action raise the general price level in the United 
States! 
The answer depends upon two things-upon the reaction of 
people in the United States, and upon the reaction of people in 
foreign countries. 
Reactions Abroad 
Let us first consider the reactions abroad. 
\Ve can use France's response as an illustration of what would 
be likely to happen abroad if we reduced the gold content of the 
dollar. At the pre.'ient time, 25.6 French francs have the same 
{?Old content as one. United States dollar. Both countries are on 
the gold standard. The ratio between the gold values of the two 
currencies is therefore fixed, and the gold behind 25.6 French 
francs will buy $1.00 worth of goods in the United States. 
If the g<'ld content of our dollar were reduced from 23.22 
grains to 16 J?rains (a redt1ction of about one-third) the gold 
behind the 25.6 French francs would then be worth $1.45 instead 
of $1.00. French importers could therefore buy gold in France, 
send it to the United States, and get riearly one-half more United 
States cotton or wheat for it than they could have obtained pre-
viously (unless prices in the United States had already risen). 
If the Frrnch government permitted French importers to ship 
gold out of l<~rance to the United States for this purpo!!e, French 
purchai:es of United States cotton and wheat woulcl increase. A11 
a result. the price of cotton ancl wheat in the United States would 
rise. This rise in prices would soon spread to other commodities, 
directly because of substitution ancl competition, and indirectly 
because of the stimulating effect that a rise in prices of one group 
of commodities would have on all business. · 
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The prices of United States industrial stocks might be stimu-
lated by foreign buying. This buying would be purely specu-
lative; it would be based on an expectation of United States in-
dustrial stocks rising as a result of the gold content of the dollar 
being reduced. It would not be based on the knowledge that 
foreign gold would now buy more United States stocks than be-
fore, because the dividends paid on those stocks would be worth 
less than before in terms of foreign gold. 
Objections from Foreign Governments 
These things would happen, as we have said, if the French 
government would permit them. It is most unlikely, h°'vever, 
that France 'vould let .them happen .• There are two reasons for 
this. 
In the first place, France already has a high tariff against 
wheat, in order to protect her own wheat producers from foreign 
competition. Her wheat producers would protest if a lowering 
of the gold value of the United States dollar should enable United 
States wheat to climb these French tariffs and compete with 
French-grown wheat. Her farmers ,\·ould ask for a 50 percent 
ad valorem increase in the French tariff on wheat, enough to 
offset the reduction in the gold content of the dollar; and if this 
were·grantcd, United States wheat exports to France would not 
increase, and United States wheat prices would not rise on that 
account. 
Even if the French go,·ernment did not listen to the complaints 
of its wheat producers, it would probably give attentive ear to 
objections from its treasury. If French importers started to ship 
gold out of France for purchasing goods, gold would flow out of 
France to the United States. Now France does not like to lose 
gold. She would probably either raise her tariffs or prohibit 
exports of gold (i.e., go off the gold standard) or ration and re-
strict her foreign exchange. Other countries, both those that 
were on the gold standard and those that were not, would do the 
same thing. 
If foreign countries did not take these steps at once, they would 
sooner or later be driven to take them by the march of events. 
Unless prices in the United States rose 45 percent at once, gold 
would flow from the rest of the world to the United States. We 
would be offering more goods per grain of gold than before. But 
we already have more gold than we need and other countries have 
less. They would quickly net to stop their gold draining out. 
France is notoriously tenacious of gold, prizing it as a "war 
chest" as well as for peace-time monetary purposes. The sim-
plest way for them to stop gold flowing to the United States for 
the purchase of goods would be for them to raise their tariffs 50 
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percent ad valorem. That would more than offset the reduction 
in the gold content of the dollar. 
The interests of the foreign nations in this case would coincide 
with the interests of the world as a whole. From the world point 
of view, an additional flow of goods from the United States and 
an additional flow of gold to the United States would be extremeJy 
undesirable. It 'vould accentuate a condition that has played a 
leading part in bringing on the present depression, and would 
run directly counter to present and pending· negotiations be-
tween the United States and foreign countries, designed to work 
out measures which will reduce the flow of gold to the United 
States and get it out in the rest of the world where it is needed. 
If some foreign countries permitted gold to be shipped out 
for the purchase of goods in the United States, some stimulation 
of our export commodity prices would result. If all foreign c6un-
tries refused to let gold be shipped out, we would not get any 
additional foreign buying of our commodities, and we would not 
get any upward stimulus to our prices from that source. 
It seems likely that most foreign countries would refuse to let 
gold be shipped out. We would therefore ha,·e to depend chiefly 
upon the reactions of our own producers and consumers. Let 
us study what reactions we might expect from our own people. 
Domestic Reactions 
To the extent that people in the United States looked at their 
five-dollar bills and other currency and said, ''Well! This money 
is worth one-third less gold than it was yesterday. I had better 
spend it before it depreciates any further,'' a rise in prices would 
result. The increased velocity or turnover of money, i. e., the 
increased purchasing of goods, would increase the demand for 
goods and raise prices generally. 
Perhaps, however, people would not act so hastily. They might 
reason to themselves, "After all, the purckasmg power of my 
dollar has not changed. They have knocked a third of the gol,d. 
out of it, but my dollar will buy the same amount of goods today 
as it would yesterday. The English pound will buy as much 
goods in England today as it would when England went ofl the 
gold standard entirely in September, 1931. I think I'll wait and 
see what prices are going to do before I do any extra buying." 
If this became the prevailing attitude, there would be no reason 
for prices to rise. We already have a great surplus of gold in 
this country, and economizing in the use of gold by reducing the 
gold value of the dollar would not directly and of itself make 
prices rise. 
A final altemative i;ihould be gh•en consideration. People might 
reason still further, "I realize that the goods value or purchasing 
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polVer of my dollar· has not changed. But whether or not the 
quantity theory of the value of money holds in the short run, I 
believe that the commodity theory holds in the long run. I be-
lieve that sooner or later prices will rise, because, regarding gold 
simply as one important commodity, the decreased gold value of 
the dollar will eventually develop into a decreased value or pur-
chasing power of the dollar for all commodities. That means 
higher prices eventually. I shall therefore go out and buy now, 
before prices begin to rise,'' and this increased buying would 
cause prices to rise. Therefore, to the extent that people believed 
that money is valuable fundamentally because of the intrinsic 
value of the gold behind it, they would expect a reduction of the 
gold content of the dollar to lead sooner or later to a reduction of 
the general purchasing power of the dollar, i. e., a rise in prices. 
Nobody can say with assurance which of these three alterna-
tives would result-an immediate rise in prices, a slow rise in 
prices, or no rise at all. SQme people would probably react one 
way, some would react another way. There is no reason to sup-
pose that a rise in prices equivalent to the reduction in the gold 
content of the dollar would immediately and automatically result, 
but it seems probable that some general rise in prices would 
develop. 
Furthermore, no one can say with assurance how far the gen-
eral rise in prices would go. A few weeks ago New Zealand re-
duced the exchange value of her currency 25 percent, and the 
prices of her speculative commodities--wheat, etc.,-rose at 
once, almost by the full amount of the reduction in the value of 
the currency.H But that rise in prices came through the effect of 
increased foreign buying of New Zealand goods. The volume of 
Ne\v Zealand products is comparatively small, and other coun-
tries did not take steps to prevent their purchases of New Zea-
land goods from expanding. But as we have seen, they would 
probably take steps against a large country like the United States. 
Furthermore, New Zealand went off the sterling standard for 
much the same reason that England went off the gold standard in 
1931-lack of sufficient gold and other means of payment to meet 
her foreign obligations. New Zealand's going off sterling, like 
England's going off gold, relieved the financial pressure on prices. 
But the United States is in the opposite situation; we are not 
suffering from a shortage of gold or other money. 
Accordingly, the rise in our prices would depend chiefly upon 
our domestic reactions, and it might be less, or more, than an 
amount equivalent to the reduction of the gold value of the dollar. 
Tbe amount of the rise in prices would depend upon the extent 
to which the rise fed on itself; it would depend upon the extent 
to which rising prices stimulated more buying, and the increased 
buying caused a further rise in prices, and so on up. 
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It is possible that the rise in prices might get out of hand. It 
is unlikely, however, that this would happen. The country is now 
awake to the danger of uncontrolled inflation and deflation, and 
public opinion would support measures for keeping the inflation 
under control. It is easier to curb inflation than it is to stop 
deflation. The Federal Reserve Board had difficulty in checking 
inflation in 1929, not because its powers were inadequate, but 
because the public did not want inflation to stop. 
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IF PRICES ROSE, WOULD THE RISE ENDURE? 
The question may be asked whether a rise in prices induced by 
monetary measures would be likely to enduret oi; whether it would 
be only temporary. The answer to this question depends chiefly 
upon whether other measures were put through, designed to cor-
rect or offset the fundamental causes of our present low prices. 
The world-wide decline in prices since 1929 was not brought on 
by a shortage of currency nor by a scarcity of gold in the United 
States, and it is not likely to be permanently cured by expanding 
currency or economizing the use of gold in the United States. If 
the decline in prices in tile United States had been caused by a 
shortage of currency or scarcity of gold in this country, measures 
on our part to expand currency or economize gold might be effec-
tive and lasting remedies. But the decline in our prices was not 
brought on by either of these monetary factors, and it is not 
likely to be cured by the measures proposed.in 
Our disease is part of a world disease; what we and the rest 
of the world are suffering from is clogged circulation. It was 
caused by the cessation of the great war-time expenditures, by 
the outbreak of nationalism after the war, and by the change in 
the position of the United States from the world's greatest debtor 
to one of the world's greatest creditors, which conflicts with her 
role as a high tariff nation and great exporter of goods. Other 
nations owe us heavy debt and interest payments, but we make 
it difficult for them to make payment in goods. .Accordingly the 
other nations have had to pay us in gold. For several years 
after the war we loaned them the money to pay us, but this only 
partially mitigated the hea\'y flow of gold to this country. For-
eign nations raised their tariffs, not only to protect their pro-
ducers but to cut down the outflow of gold. When we ceased 
loaning abroad from 1929 on, that support to foreign purchasing 
power gave way, and the international economic machinery has 
been working badly enr since. 
Monetary Measures Are Only Emergency Measures 
.As an emergency measure monetary inflation may help. But 
it would be only an emergency effort. It would not go to the 
roots of the trouble. 
The evidence seems to be that a reduction in the gold content 
of the dollar would probably not benefit us for very long, unless 
it· were accompanied by other measure.'! to cure the fundamental 
causes of .the present depressiol!. These ~ensures would include, 
for instance, a gradual reduction of tar1ffs all over the world, 
particularly in the United States because tariffs conflict with our 
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new world-creditor role; some reduction of the debts owed to us 
by other nations; temporary reductions in United States agri-
cultµral production, perhaps by some such measure as the domes-
tic allotment plan. These are remedies for the fundamental 
troubles, and they cannot be instituted overnight. But full re-
covery is not likely to take place until they are put into effect. 
Numerous other inflationary proposals are engaging 
public attention at the present time. In the appendixes 
on the following pages we are merely drawing attention 
to some of them, without attempting any detailed 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX I 
Would a Rise in 'the General Price Level Help Agriculture?· 
When the general level of prices at wholesale declines, the 
prices of agricultural products usually fall faster than the gen-
eral price level, because the costs of distribution from producer 
to consumer remain relatively constant. Since 1929, for example, 
the general price level has fallen 48 points, but agricultural 
prices have fallen 87 points.16 
If the general price level were to rise now, would agricultural 
prices rise more rapidly and perhaps return to their 1929 relation 
to other prices Y Or would they rise only sluggishly, so that 
agriculture would not be greatly benefited T 
The answer appears to depend upon how the rise in the general 
price level were brought about. If the rise 'vere the result of 
world-wide recovery, then agricultural prices could be expected 
to rise more rapidly than the general price level. 
If the rise in the general price le,·el were brought about by 
reducing the gold content of the l!nited States dollar, and if 
foreign nations permitted gold to flow to the United States for 
the purchase of goods, then the prices of export agricultural 
products-wheat, cotton, etc.-,vould lead in the rise. We have 
seen, however, that foreign countries would not be likely to let 
this happen. 
If the rise in the general price level resulted from currency 
or credit inflation in the United States and was not accompanied 
by a similar rise abroad, and no reductions were made in foreign 
tariffs abroad, then the prices of our agricultural export commod-
ities, which are largely world prices, would probably not rise 
very much. They would be held down by low world prices and 
low foreign demand, and their rise would probably be less than 
the rise in the United States general price level. 
Any rise in agricultural prices, however, would render it easier 
for agriculture to meet her fixed charges, and these are one of the 
most troublesome elements in the cost of operating a farm today. 
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APPENDIX II 
Velocity of Circulation 
. The discussion in the main body of the bulletin has made very 
little reference to one important element, the influence o( changes 
in the velocity of circulation of money. 
This element is probably as important as changes in the quan-
tity of money. It has not been stressed in the general discus-
sion, for three reasons. First, most of the proposals for price 
inflation have aimed mainly at increasing the quantity of money 
rather than the velocity. Second, changes in the velocity of 
money generally are associated with changes in the quantity of 
money, so that the analysis based on quantity alone is substan-
tially accurate. And finally, if velocity is left out, the presen-
tation is simplified, and every measure of simplification is needed 
in dealing with as.complicated and technical a subject as mone-
tary inflation. 
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APPENDIX III 
Bimetallism 
Proposals have been made for the federal government to 
broaden. the currency base by remonetizing silver and adopting 
a bimetallic standard. 
These proposals call for the purchase of several billions of 
dollars of silver by the federal government, which would then 
issue silver certificates based on the metal purchased. 
This method of currency expansion is open to the same diffi-
culties that beset other forms of currency expansion. It has the 
further disadvantage that the money expended by the govern-
ment would not result in an addition to the capital equipment of 
the country. l\Ioney spent on roads or other engineering projects 
would leave the country better equipped than it was before; 
money spent in the purchase of silver would leave only an empty 
silver mine in its wake. And finally, bimetallism involves the 
difficulty of keeping the mint value ratio between the two metals 
in line with the continually shifting market value ratio. In 
Bryan's time the market ratio was about 16 to 1; at the present 
time, the ratio is about 80 to 1. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Symmetalism 
Symmetalism is a simpler method of remonetizing silver than 
bimetallism. When a country is on the gold standard, the stand-
ard of value is gold. When a country is on a symmetallie stand-
ard, the standard of value is a fixed combination of gold and 
silver, for instance 80 percent gold and 20 percent silver. Under 
symmetalism, we would have lying in our bank vaults, not bars 
of gold, but bars of 80 percent gold and 20 percent silver. 
Adopting symmetalism is not very different from reducing the 
gold value of the dollar. It simply allows a given amount of 
gold to go further. It has the disadvantage that it involves the 
purchase of additional monetary metal, but it has the advantage 
that it would, at least in some sense, provide a full metallic back-
ing for the currency. Probably reducing the ~old value would 
be the better plan for any one nation to adopt, but symmetalism 
would be the better if world action were being considered. 
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APPENDIX V 
Reducing Gold Reserve Requirements 
The twelve Federal Reserve banks are required by law to 
carry a minimum i·eserve of 40 percent gold against their note 
issues, the other 60 percent being commercial paper (or, since 
the passage of the Glass-Steagall act, government bonds). ~hey 
are also required to carry a minimum reserve of 35 percent gold 
against their deposit liabilities. 
These minimum reserve ratios were originally 'vorked out 
and adopted when gold coins circulated as hand-to-hand cur-
rency. The banking system then needed to carry a reserve of 
gold to meet a demand for gold coins from its own citizens, as 
well as from the citizens of other countries. It needed to carry 
a reserve of gold to meet a domestic or internal drain as well 
as an external drain. 
Since the war, however, this situation has changed. Gold 
coins have largely disappeared from circulation; we use bank 
notes or checks, instead of coin. Hardly anyone sees gold any 
more. The need for a reserve of gold to meet an internal drain 
is much less than it used to be (except under panic conditions 
when people might start hoarding gold). Our present reserve 
requirement of 40 percent may therefore be higher than neces-
sary. Some responsible authorities belieYe that our existing 
reserve requirements should be lowered. 
The Gold Delegation of the League of Nations, for example, 
after studying this question, summarizes its opinions as follows: 
"In our opinion, this whole system of defined ratios has proved itself in, 
the light of the special circumstances of post·war years to be too rigid and 
.inadaptable. Now that gold coin is in circulation only in a very few countries 
and an internal drain cannoL take place (except in momenta of violent panic 
for hoarding as bullion), thr reserves are primarily required to meet possible 
deficits in the balance of intemational payments. Each country in determin· 
ing the gold reserve required should therefore consider in tl1e first instance 
what the range of movement in its bnlnnce of payments is likely to be. 
"We are of opinion that it would be advantageous, as we argued in our 
first Interim Report, to reduce the reserve ratios from their present high 
levels. If this were done, the immediate effect would be to free the hands 
of the Central Banks by enlarging the free margin of their gold reserves 
which tl1ey cnn use for intemationnl payments wiU1out endangering the Jega1 
minimum ratio. "lf 
What effect would a reduction in t1iese legal minimum reserve 
ratios have upon prices f 
If our stocks of gold were getting low, it would ha~·e a very 
beneficial effect, for when reserves of gold fall close to their 
minimum legal limit. bankers put up their discount rates. This 
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attracts gold and builds up their reserves, but it also contracts 
credit, depresses business activity and lowers prices. 
If present low prices in the United States could be attributed 
to insufficient stocks of gold in the United States, then lowering 
the minimum gold reserve requirements would help. It would 
relieve bankers of the necessity of raising their discount rates 
and thus contracting credit. When England suspended gold 
payments altogether in September, 1931, that action removed 
the downward pressure which a foreign drain of gold was ex-
erting on English prices. 
At the present time, holvever, gold reserves in the United 
States are not down close to the legal limit of 40 percent. Our 
gold reserves at present are 63 percent, and they are still grow-
ing. Lowering the legal reserve ratios now would not neces-
sarily have any anti-deflationary effect. It would simply increase 
our already large surplus reserves. It would permit a substantial 
inflation, it would raise the "ceiling" toward which prices could 
rise, but it would not cause any inflation. It would permit prices 
fo rise, but it would not give them any upward push. 
The word of caution that was spoken in the part of this bulle-
tin that deals with the effect of reducing the gold content of the 
dollar applies here also. Lowering minimum gold reserves, like 
reducing the gold content of the dollar, would allow an inftation 
of prices to go to greater lengths than it could go under present 
regulations, before being checked by limitations of the gold 
supply. The danger of too much inflation seems remote at the 
present time, but it might become a real danger 5, 10, or 15 years 
hence. · 
134 
SOURCES OF DATA 
1. Tho dnta plotted are tho Bureau of Labor Statistics indexes of the 
general level of prices at wholesale, converted from their 1926 base 
to a 1910·1014 base by division by tho 1010-1914 average, 68.5, 
2. · Jt'edoral Reserve Bulletin, January, 1933, p. 24. 
3. Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1932, pp. 180·181. 
4. Federal Reservo Bulletin, August, 1932, pp. 478-480. 
5. Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 1933, p. 13. Tho sum given is the 
difference between tho national bank notes in circulation on Dec. 31, 
10311 and Dee. 31, 1932. 
6. E. A. Goldonwoiser. Federal Re11orve System in Operation. McGraw· 
Hill Book Co. 1925. pp. 79 and 86. 
7. This figure is obtained by dividing the total 'deposits of all banks in 
tho United States, 41,779 million dollars, by the United States mone-
tary gold stocks, 4,429 million dollars. Data given in the Federal Re· 
servo Bulletin, January, 19331 pp. 11 and 16. 
8. Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 1933, pp. 13 and 16. Tho data used 
to represent "credit money" arc the total United States bank dopes· 
its, exclusive of interbank deposits. 
9. Des Moines Register, Feb. 4, 1933. 
10. Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 1933, p. 21. 
11. Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 19331 p. 36. 
12. As a matter of fact, it has risen 50 percent; but a one-third reduction 
of the gold content of the dollar would increase the gold purchasing 
power of the dolJar 50 percent. 
13. That is, 23.22 divided by 16 = 1.45. 
14. The statements concerning New Zealand arc based only upon a brief 
report in Time, Jan. 30, 1933, p. 16. Fuller information is not yet 
available. 
15. For a more comprehensive statement of the causes of the present 
emergency, see Circular 140 in this series. 
16. The Agricultural Situation, February, 1933, pp. 14·15. 
17. Report of the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee. League of 
Nations, Geneva, 1932. 
135 
RECENT ECONOMICS PUBLICATIONS 
The following bulletins and circulars have been issued 
recently by the Agricultural Economics Section of the 
Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station. They may be 
obtained free upon request to the Bulletin Office, Agricul-
tural Annex, Iowa State College, Ames, IO\va. 
B289 Costs and Utilization of Com in Boven Iowa Countica, by 
H. L. Thomaa and John A. Hopkina, Jr. 
B289a Why Com Coats Vary (Abridgement of B289), by H. L. 
Thomas and John A. Hopkina, Jr. 
B294 An Economic Study of Hog Enterpriao, by John A. Hopkina, 
Jr. 
B295 A Plan for Adjusting Cash Bent to Changca in the Pricea of 
~·arm Producta, by .Millard Peck. 
R156 An Economic Analysis of Farm .Mortgages in Story County, 
Iowa, 1854·1931, by W. G. llurray. 
Cl35 Report of a Survey of Graded Egg Buying in Iowa, by W. D. 
Tcrmohlen. 
CJ36 Statiatics of Liveatock .Marketing and Livestock Trucking in 
Iowa in 1931, by D. A. FitzGerald. 
Cl39 The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa L The Situation Today, 
by A. G. Black. 
CHO The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa D. The Causea of the 
Emergency, by Geoffrey Shepherd. 
CHI Tho Agricultural Emergency in Iowa m The Voluntary Do· 
mestie Allotment Plan, by Theodore W. Schultz and A. G. 
Black. 
CH2 The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa IV. Iowa Farm Mort· 
gage Situation, by William G. Murray and Ronald C. Bentley. 
CH3 The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa V. Control of the Gen· 
. eral Price Level, by Geoft'rey Shepherd and Wallace Wright. 
CH4 The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa VL The Iowa Tax 
Situation-An Analyaia for Farmera, by John A. Hopkina, Jr. 

